Carbon abatement under financial incentives and moral suasion: A real-effort experiment
Technology Adoption and Early Network Infrastructure Provision in the Market for Electric Vehicles
Social comparison and energy conservation in a collective action context: A field experiment
Technology adoption and early network infrastructure provision in the market for electric vehicles
Asymmetric Information on the Market for Energy Efficiency: Insights from the Credence Goods Literature
Asymmetric information on the market for energy efficiency: Insights from the credence goods literature
Imperfect information is widely acknowledged to hamper the adoption of energy efficient technologies. In this paper, we study supply-side implications of theassociated incentive structure. We build on existing evidence suggesting that energyefficiency owns a credence component, whereby the supply side of the market hasmore information about what technology is best for consumers. The literature oncredence goods markets suggests that informational advantage by an expert-seller leads to market inefficiencies, including low trade volume. We start by developing a simple framework to study supply-side incentives related to the provision of energy efficient technologies. We then document inefficiencies and potential remediesby discussing linkages between an empirical literature on credence goods and thaton the market for energy efficiency. Doing so, we identify policy implications andresearch gaps that are relevant for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.
Technology Adoption and Early Network Infrastructure Provision in the Market for Electric Vehicles
We document non-linear stock effects in the relationship linking emerging technology adoption and network infrastructure increments. We exploit 2010–2017 data covering nascent to mature electric vehicle (EV) markets across 422 Norwegian municipalities together with two complementary identification strategies: control function regressions of EV sales on flexible polynomials in the stock of charging stations and charging points, and synthetic control methods to quantify the impact of initial infrastructure provision in municipalities that previously had none. Our results are consistent with indirect network effects and the behavioral bias called “range anxiety,” and support policies targeting early infrastructure provision to incentivize EV adoption.
Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods
We study the role of reciprocity in markets where expert-sellers have more information about the severity of a problem faced by a consumer. We employ a standard experimental credence goods market to introduce the possibility for consumers to gift the expert-seller before the diagnostic, where the gift is either transferred unconditionally or conditionally on solving the problem. We find that both types of gifts increase the frequency of consumer-friendly actions relative to no gift, but only conditional gifts translate into efficiency gains when the consumer faces a high-severity problem. This suggests that partial alignment of incentives via conditional gifts may outweigh kindness motives when reciprocal actions are not directly observed. Using further treatments with surprise gift exchange, we show that withholding a gift that is expected by expert-sellers significantly reduces the likelihood of consumer-friendly behavior whereas sending a gift to expertsellers who do not expect one has no effect.